Quantal Response Equilibrium by Goeree, Jacob K. et al.
Quantal Response Equilibrium 
 
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, and Thomas R. Palfrey1
 
 
Motivation 
Economic theory relies extensively on the assumption of perfect rationality, 
which makes it possible to construct general models with strong (and sometimes 
surprising) predictions.  The evaluation of these models using field data requires the 
incorporation of random errors representing unobserved and omitted elements, 
measurement error, etc.  Evaluation of these models using data from laboratory 
experiments also requires an error structure, since choice behavior in the laboratory is 
also noisy, showing clear mistakes and inconsistencies over time.   
Probabilistic choice models (e.g., logit, probit) have long been used to incorporate 
stochastic elements in to the analysis of individual decisions, and the quantal response 
equilibrium (QRE) is the analogous way to model games with noisy players.  These 
probabilistic choice models are based on quantal response functions, which have the 
intuitive feature that deviations from optimal decisions are negatively correlated with the 
associated costs.  That is, individuals are more likely to select better choices than worse 
choices, but do not necessarily succeed in selecting the very best choice. Formally, a 
quantal response function maps the vector of expected payoffs from available choices 
into a vector of choice probabilities that is monotone in the expected payoffs.  
In a strategic game environment, a player’s expected payoffs from different 
strategies are determined by beliefs about other players’ actions, so beliefs determine 
expected payoffs, which in turn, generate choice probabilities according to some quantal 
response function.  A quantal response equilibrium (QRE) imposes the requirement that 
the beliefs match the equilibrium choice probabilities.  Thus, QRE requires solving for a 
fixed point in the choice probabilities, analogous to the Nash equilibrium. 
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In fact, QRE is a generalization of Nash equilibrium, which converges to the Nash 
equilibrium as the quantal response functions become very steep, and approximate best 
response functions.  This approach provides a useful theoretical framework for looking at 
comparative statics effects of parameter changes that may not alter Nash predictions.  The 
incorporation of random elements also provides a foundation for standard statistical 
analysis of field and laboratory data in game theoretic applications.    
 
A Motivating Example: Generalized Matching Pennies 
 Before providing general definitions, it is useful to begin with a simple two-
person matching pennies game in which the Row player chooses top (T) or bottom (B) 
and the Column player chooses left (L) or right (R).  Row wins a penny (and column 
loses a penny) if the outcome is (top, right) or (bottom, left) and Column wins a penny 
otherwise.  Thus Row’s expected payoff  for Top (UT) is a function of Column’s 
probability of choosing Right (pR), which is easily calculated as UT (pR) =  pR – (1–pR ) = 
2pR – 1, and similarly, UB (pR) = 1 – 2pR, so the optimal decision is to choose Top if 
Column is more likely to choose Right, i.e. if  pR > ½.  Column’s expected payoffs are 
computed analogously, as a function of Row’s probability of choosing Top (pT). 
Figure 1 illustrates the best response functions in the unit square of mixed 
strategies in the game, with the y-axis representing the row player’s Top choice 
probability and the x-axis representing the column player’s Right choice. The best 
response for Row is indicated by the dark step function from that crosses from the bottom 
to the top at ½.  Similarly, the Column player’s best response line is the step function, 
shown in gray, which crosses over from left to right at a height of ½.   
Using the same figure, we can represent a quantal response function, which 
smooths out the discontinuous best response function, reflecting the monotone but 
stochastic choice as a function of payoffs.  Such a quantal response function is illustrated 
by Row’s dark curved line that rises smoothly from the bottom left corner to the top-right 
corner.  The probabilistic choice equals ½ exactly at the point where row player is 
indifferent between Top and Bottom. A quantal response function is also drawn for 
Column. The intersection of these two quantal response functions occurs in the center of 
the figure, and is the quantal response equilibrium, just as the intersection of the sharp 
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best response function at the same point is the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (½ 
for each decision). 
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Figure 1. Players’ Best Responses and Quantal Responses For a Generalized Matching Pennies Game 
 
Now suppose that all payoffs stay the same except for the Top-Right outcome, 
which gives Row a higher payoff of 9 and Column –1 as before.  The increase in Row’s 
Top-Right payoff shifts Row’s Best response line upward, as indicated by the dotted line 
step function in the figure, and it also shifts Row’s quantal response (smooth dotted line).  
The new Nash equilibrium (dot at the intersection of the step functions) is at pT = 0.5, 
whereas the new QRE is at a higher level of the probability of Top.  This intuitive ``own 
payoff'' effect contrasts with the Nash equilibrium prediction of no change in Row's 
choice probabilities (since they are determined by the requirement that Column is 
indifferent).  The own-payoff effect predicted by regular QRE accords with data from 
laboratory experiments that employ an asymmetric matching-pennies structure, e.g. Ochs 
(1995), McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber (2000), Goeree and Holt (2001), and Goeree, 
Holt, and Palfrey (2003). 
 
 3
Definitions 
Let G = (N, {S1,…,Sn}, π1,…, πn) be a normal-form game, where N = {1,…,n} is 
the set of players, Si = {si1,…,siJ(i)} is player i’s set of strategies and S = S1 X … X SN is 
the set of strategy profiles, and πi : Si → R is player i’s payoff function.  Furthermore, let 
Σi = ∆J(i) be the set of probability distributions over Si.  An element σi ε Σi is a mixed-
strategy, which is a mapping from Si to Σi, where σi(si) is the probability that player i 
chooses pure-strategy si.  Let Σ = Σ1 X … X ΣN be the set of mixed-strategy profiles.  
Given a mixed-strategy profile σ ε Σ, player i’s expected payoff is πi(σ) = Σs ε S p(s) πi(s), 
where p(s) = Π i ε N σi(si) is the probability distribution over pure-strategy profiles induced 
by σ.   
Let Pij denote the probability that player i selects strategy j.  Recall that the main 
idea behind QRE is that strategies with higher expected payoffs are more likely to be 
chosen, although the best strategy is not necessarily chosen with probability 1.   In other 
words, QRE replaces players’ strict rational choice best-responses by smoothed best 
responses or quantal responses. 
 
Definition 1: Pi : RJ(i) → ∆J(i)  is a regular quantal-response function if it satisfies the 
following four axioms. 
- Interiority: Pij(πi) > 0 for all j = 1,…, J(i) and for all πi ε RJ(i). 
- Continuity:  Pij(πi) is a continuously differentiable function for all πi ε RJ(i). 
- Responsiveness: ∂Pij(πi)/∂πij > 0 for all j = 1,…, J(i) and for all πi ε RJ(i). 
- Monotonicity: πij  > πik implies that Pij(πi) > Pik(πi) for all j, k = 1,…, J(i). 
 
These axioms are economically and intuitively compelling.  Interiority ensures the model 
has full domain, i.e. is logically consistent with all possible data sets. This is important 
for empirical applications of the model. Continuity is a technical restriction, which 
ensures that Pi is non-empty and single-valued. Furthermore, it seems a natural 
assumption since arbitrarily small changes in expected payoffs should not lead to jumps 
in choice probabilities. Responsiveness requires that if the expected payoff of an action 
increases, ceteris paribus, the choice probability must also increase. Monotonicity is a 
weak form of rational choice that involves binary comparisons of actions: an action with 
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higher expected payoff is chosen more frequently than an action with a lower expected 
payoff.  
Define P(π) = (P1(π1),…, Pn(πn)) to be regular if each Pi satisfies the above regularity 
axioms. Since P(π) ε Σ and π = π(σ)  is defined for any σ ε Σ, P ○ σ defines a mapping 
from Σ into itself. 
 
Definition 2:  Let P be regular. A Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (R-QRE) of 
the normal-form game G is a mixed-strategy profile σ* such that σ* = P(σ*). 
 
Since regularity of P includes continuity, P ○ σ is a continuous mapping. Existence of a 
regular QRE therefore follows directly from Brouwer's fixed-point theorem. 
 
Theorem:  There exists a Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (R-QRE) of G for any 
regular P. 
 
Empirical Implications of Regular QRE 
The axioms underlying regular QRE collectively have strong empirical 
implications, even without any parametric assumptions on P. To illustrate the nature of 
these restrictions, consider again the generalized matching-pennies game, where Row's 
payoff is X when the outcome is (top, right).  If X > 1, it is readily verified that Row's 
expected payoff of choosing "top" is higher than of choosing "bottom" when pR < 2/(X+3) 
(pR > 2/(X+3)).  Monotonicity therefore implies that, if (pR*, pT*) defines a regular QRE, 
it must satisfy the inequalities:  pT* ≥ ½ if pR ≥ 2/(X+3) and vice versa.  Likewise, 
Column's expected payoff of choosing "right" is higher (lower) than of choosing "left" 
when pT < ½ (pT > ½). Thus (pR*, pT*) must satisfy pR* ≤ ½ if  pT ≥ ½, and vice versa. 
The region defined by these inequalities defines the set of possible regular QRE.  For the 
specific case of X = 9, this area is shown by the dark gray shaded area in Figure 2.  The 
three black dots show the Nash equilibria for X = 9 (left), X = 1 (center) and X = 0 (right). 
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Figure 2. QRE Sets for Generalized Matching Pennies with X = 9 (dark) and X = 0 (light) 
 
The case -1 < X < 1 can be analyzed in a similar way. The set of regular QRE for 
X = 0, for instance, is given by the light shaded area in Figure 2. Note that the Row player 
is predicted to choose ''top'' more often than ''bottom'' in an R-QRE when X > 1, while the 
reverse is true for X < 1. In fact, the responsiveness axiom can be used to show that if 
Row's payoff of the (top, right) outcome rises, Row's probability of choosing ''top'' 
increases.  
 
Proposition (Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 2005). In any regular QRE of the asymmetric 
matching pennies game, Row's probability of choosing "top" is strictly increasing in X 
and Column's probability of choosing "right" is strictly decreasing in X. 
 
Quantal Response Equilibrium: A Structural Definition   
The original definition of QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995) adopts an approach 
in the spirit of Harsanyi (1973) and McFadden (1976) whereby the choice probabilities 
are rationalized by privately observed, mean zero random disturbances to the expected 
payoffs. These disturbances are assumed to be private information to the players, thereby 
converting the original game into special kind of game of incomplete information.  Any 
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Bayesian equilibrium of this disturbed game is a QRE of the underlying game. The 
quantal response function generating the QRE is determined by the probability 
distribution of the random payoff disturbances.  
Thus a smoothed response line can be interpreted to be the (inverse) distribution 
function of the differences between the disturbances, which has a value of ½ when the 
expected payoffs are equal.  For example, if the disturbances are iid and normally 
distributed, then the quantal response functions will take the shape of a “probit” curve, 
while if the iid disturbances are distributed according to an extreme value distribution the 
quantal response functions will have a logistic form.  For example, the logit QRE for the 
generalized matching pennies game is a pair of probabilities that solve: 
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where the numerators are exponential functions of the expected payoffs for the 
corresponding decision (T or R), and the denominators are normalizing factors that force 
probabilities to sum to 1.  As the logit precision parameter λ increases, the response 
functions become more responsive to payoff differences, and the logit response functions 
converge to the sharp step functions shown in Figure 1.   
The disturbances in the structural approach to QRE can be interpreted in several 
ways.  One possibility is to interpret them literally.  That is, one views the underlying 
game as simply a model of the average game being played, with each actual game player 
being a mean zero perturbation of the basic game.  With this view, one can think of the 
payoff disturbances as reflecting the effects of unobservable components such as a 
player’s mood, perceptual variations, etc.  A second possibility is to think of the players 
as statisticians, whose objective is to estimate the payoff of each strategy using some 
unknown set of instruments to perform the estimation.  For general abstract games, a 
reasonable first cut is to suppose that their estimation errors are unbiased.  The players 
then choose the strategy with the highest estimated expected payoffs, implicitly taking 
into account that the other players are also estimating payoffs with some error, with the 
resulting equilibrium corresponding to QRE.   
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One can show that the quantal response function generated by iid disturbances 
will always have the continuity and monotonicity properties of regular quantal response 
functions, and therefore will lead to regular QRE.  In particular, the comparative static 
result of the previous section holds for the logit QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996).  If 
disturbances are not iid, however, non-monotonicities are possible.  Haile et al. (2004) 
use this observation to show that without restrictions on the disturbances, structural QRE 
can explain any data.  One way to avoid this problem is to make the iid assumption or 
impose the weaker notion of interchangeability (Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 2005).   A 
second way is to generate restrictions is to constrain the same structural assumptions to 
hold across different data sets, thereby generating comparative static predictions. Another 
solution is to simply work directly with the regularity axioms of Definition 1 – the 
resulting quantal response functions do impose empirical restrictions on the data and do 
not inherit the unintuitive features of the structural approach such as symmetry and strong 
substitutability.2
 
Applications: Quantal Response Equilibrium in Normal-Form Games 
 In an individual choice problem, the addition of “noise” spreads out the 
distribution of decisions around the expected-payoff-maximizing decision.  In contrast, 
expected payoffs in a game depend on other players’ choice probabilities, and this 
interactive element can magnify the effects of noise via feedback effects.  One notable 
example is a coordination game where each person’s payoff is the minimum of all 
player’s efforts, minus a cost parameter, c, times a player’s own effort.  If c < 1, any 
common effort level is a Nash equilibrium, since a unilateral decrease below a common 
effort reduces the minimum and saves the cost, for a net loss of 1–c for each unit 
reduction in effort.  Conversely, a unilateral effort increase does not alter the minimum, 
so the loss is –c.  Therefore c affects the downward slopes of the expected payoff 
function in each direction, and if there is any uncertainty about others’ decisions, low 
values of c make effort increases less risky.  It is not surprising that reductions in the 
                                                 
2 Symmetry requires that the effect of an increase in strategy k's payoff on the probability of choosing 
strategy j is the same as the effect of an increase in strategy j's payoff on the probability of choosing 
strategy k.  Strong Substitutability implies (among other things) that if the payoff of strategy k rises, the 
probability of choosing any of the other strategies j ≠ k falls. 
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effort cost c tend to increase average efforts, both in laboratory experiments with human 
subjects and in a quantal response equilibrium with noisy behavior (Anderson, Goeree, 
and Holt, 2001).3  
 The traveler’s dilemma is another game where small amounts of noise can have 
large effects.  As in the coordination game, the payoffs depend on the minimum of all 
decisions (“claims”).  This is a two-person “lost luggage” problem, where the airline 
representative interprets unequal damage claims as evidence that the high claimant is 
inflated unjustly.  Each player earns the minimum of the two claims, with a penalty of R 
subtracted from the payoff for the high claimant and added to that of the low claimant.  
As with the coordination game, claims must be in a specified interval, but in the 
Traveler’s Dilemma the unique Nash equilibrium is the lowest possible claim in this 
interval, irrespective of the magnitude of R, as long as the benefit R from a reduction 
below a common claim is greater than the smallest permitted claim reduction.  In 
contrast, intuition suggests that claims will be high when the penalty from having the 
higher claim is low.  In the Capra et al. (1999) experiment, reductions in the penalty 
parameter, R, induce dramatic increases in claims, moving the average from near Nash 
levels for high values of R to the opposite side of the range of feasible claims for low 
values of R.  This strong treatment effect is tracked well by the quantal response 
equilibrium with the same precision parameter used to track the coordination game data. 
 In addition to these applications, the QRE has been used to explain “anomalous” 
behavior in a wide variety of games, including signaling games, centipede games, two-
stage bargaining, and overbidding in auctions (Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 2002).  In 
addition, the quantal response equilibrium has proven to be quite useful in the analysis of 
data from political science experiments: jury voting (Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and 
Palfrey, 2000), voter turnout (Levine and Palfrey, 2005), and behavior in participation 
games (Goeree and Holt, 2005; Cason and Van Lam, 2005). 
 
                                                 
3  For the two-person coordination game experiments reported in Goeree and Holt (2005), a reduction in the 
effort cost parameter from 0.75 to 0.25 raised average effort levels from 126 to 159 in the final 5 rounds.  
With payoffs in pennies and a precision parameter of 0.1, the logit QRE predictions for this game are 126 
and 154 for the high and low effort costs.  Thus the QRE tracks the strong behavioral response to the 
treatment change, whereas the range of Nash equilibria (from 110 to 170) is unaffected by this change. 
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Applications: Quantal Response Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games   
The QRE approach has also been developed for extensive form games (McKelvey 
and Palfrey 1998), where the analysis in done using behavioral strategies. In the 
extensive form QRE, players follow Bayes’ rule and calculate expected continuation 
payoffs based on the QRE strategies of the other players.  Interiority implies that over the 
nodes at every information set are uniquely defined for any QRE strategy profile. 
Therefore issues related to belief-based refinements do not arise and a quantal response 
version of sequential rationality follows immediately.  When quantal response functions 
approach best response functions, then the limiting QRE of the extensive form game will 
select a subset of the sequential equilibria of the underlying game. 
QRE in extensive form games will typically have different implied choice 
probabilities than would obtain if the same quantal response function were applied to the 
same game in its reduced normal form.  This occurs for two reasons.  First, QRE is not 
immune to “reduction” of equivalent strategies, since duplicate strategies will generally 
change the quantal response choice probabilities, for much the same reason as the “red 
bus – blue bus” example in discrete choice econometrics. Second, expected payoff 
differences are different when one collapses an extensive form game into its normal 
form: with behavior strategies, expected payoffs are computed at the interim stage, 
conditioning on previous actions in the game; in contrast, normal form mixed strategies 
are calculated ex ante. 
 
Summary 
 The quantal response approach to the analysis of games has proven to be a useful 
generalization of the Nash equilibrium, especially when dealing with “noisy decisions” 
made by boundedly-rational players and by subjects in experiments.  It can be extended 
to allow for learning and cognitive belief formation in one-shot games where learning is 
not possible.  This approach provides a coherent framework for analyzing an otherwise 
bewildering array of “biases” and anomalies in economics.     
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